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This article focuses upon Walter Gove's (1970) critique 
of the labeling approach to mental disorder. However, its 
implications go beyond this to suggest the weaknesses inherent 
in the narrow conception of labeling processes. This narrow 
conception is characterized by an exclusive concern for the 
direct, public forms of labeling and stigmatization. The 
argument presented here is that these factors are only part 
of a much broader process of societal reaction. This more 
inclusive conception of societal reaction suggests that 
self-labeling is a crucial dimension of this process. 
Furthermore, very subtle types of communications which uphold 
the deviant role may be passed. These validating responses 
may not be hostile in any direct or intentional sense. Thus, 
the labeling process does not have to appear as an obvious 
form of victimization where the person is stigmatized 
publicly. It is suggested here that the forces of social 
control work in a much quieter, more efficient, but not 
necessarily less violent, way. 
Walter R. Gove (1970) in his article, "Societal Reaction as an 
Explanation of Mental Illness: An Evaluation," presents a carefully structured 
critique of the societal reactionist or labeling approach to mental disorder. 
Gove suggests that although there has been a considerable amount of 
theoretical exposition concerning the labeling of deviant behavior, there 
has been little systematic empirical evaluation of the approach. 
Gove's criticisms fall into two major categories. One category focuses 
upon the entrance of a person into the mentally ill role, while the other 
concerns the consequences of hospitalization for the individual. In his 
discussion of the former, Gove focuses upon Scheff's formalization of the 
effects of labeling on entrance into the role of the mentally ill. Gove 
criticizes Scheff for underemphasizing the Importance of primary deviation 
(those symptomatic behaviors existing before direct labeling of the deviant); 
but Gove is not content to stop there, and extends his critique to the 
general reactionist position that focuses on labeling as the primary factor 
leading to mental illness. Gove shows (through examination of a limited 
number of available empirical studies) that it is likely that severe 
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psychological disturbances exist prior to the direct labeling of an 
individual as mentally ill. He suggests that the data indicate that labelers 
in fact go to great lengths to deny the problem until the time when the 
behavior is so disordered it can no longer be tolerated. Gove also presents 
data that suggest that even official labelers perform more of a screening 
role than the reactionists give them credit for. Gove argues that these 
data contradict the position óf the societal reactionist school, that it is 
social reaction that causes an individual to adopt the mentally ill role. 
Gove also focuses upon what the reactionists have characterized as the 
consequences of hospitalization. He criticizes the reactionist position 
that suggests that "...once a person has gone through a public hearing, and 
has been certified as a deviant and placed in an institution, it is extremely 
difficult for that person to break out of his deviant status." Gove argues 
that much of the research supporting this reactionist assertion is based on 
what goes on in the hospital. He suggests that this may be biased in that 
it probably focuses on long term patients who make up the minority of the 
hospital population, and ignores the majority of patients whose hospital 
stay is short. Gove admits that the hospital stay can be debilitating in 
some respects, but he asserts that this does not deny the fact that 
restitutive processes are also operating. Gove relying heavily upon the 
work of Sampson, et al_. (1961 , 1964), suggests that there are a number of 
therapeutic consequences of hospitalization. He concludes that today most 
patients receive fairly rapid intensive care, and for most of these 
individuals, the restitutive aspects of hospitalization are likely to outweigh 
the debilitati ve. 
Gove (1970:880-881) also criticizes the reactionist position that 
suggests that stigmatization resulting from hospitalization prevents the 
individual from resuming "... his previous interpersonal and instrumental 
roles." In summarizing the work of Angrist et_. al_. (1968), Gove (1970:881) 
says that "...expectations for poor performance may be determined more by . 
ineffectual behavior than the reverse." Gove citing again the work of 
Angrist et̂ . al. (1968) states that the data indicate that many patients were 
not rehospitaTized seven years after their initial release, and those 
readmitted tended to be institutionalized as a last resort. He concludes that 
the data suggest that stigmatization related to hospitalization does not have 
as much of an impact as the reactionists assume. Furthermore, when stigma 
is a problem it is related more to the person's current psychiatric status, 
or general ineffectiveness, than it is to his having been institutionalized 
in the past. 
Gove (1970:881) argues that those taking the societal reaction position 
do not view the deviant as one "...who is suffering from intrapersonal dis-
order but instead as someone who, through a set of circumstances, becomes 
publicly labeled a deviant and who is forced by societal reaction into a 
deviant role." The reactionists view the deviant as one who has been 
victimized. Gove (1970:881) argues that based on available evidence the 
"...societal reaction formulation of how a person becomes mentally ill is 
substantially incorrect." He based this conclusion on his interpretation of 
the data that suggest that the hospitalized mentally ill are rightfully 
labeled since they suffer from serious psychiatric disturbances prior to any 
stigmatizing reaction. 
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Gove should be commended for his criticism of an extreme reactionist 
position that would view mental disorder as the exclusive result of direct, 
negative labeling. Gove is also quite correct in his plea for more research 
into the causation of primary residual deviation. However, grave questions 
can be raised with respect to Gove's conclusion that the societal reaction 
approach is "substantially incorrect." 
The Problems of the Mentally Disordered Prior to Labeling 
Throughout Gove's paper there is the implicit idea that the reactionists 
view the labeled mental patient as someone who has no outstanding problems 
except for the fact that a stigmatizing label carrying negative social and 
personal consequences has been unjustly affixed to him. Gove's characteriza-
tion suggests that the reactionists see the labeled person's mental disorder 
as the result of stigmatization that invariably follows direct, negative, 
official, public labeling. 
In his section regarding entrance into the mentally ill role, Gove 
relies primarily upon Scheff's interpretation of labeling theory to 
critique the reactionists1 school. If Gove had given careful consideration 
to others associated with the reactionist perspective of mental disorder, 
such as Sullivan, Boisen, Laing, Cooper, Esterson, Lemert, Goffman, and 
Szasz, it would have been difficult for him to have arrived at the same 
conclusions: Those taking the reactionist position generally do not assert 
that persons labeled mentally ill are likely to be free of severe behavioral 
problems beyond those that are generated by direct stigmatization. Even to 
interpret the extreme sociological position of Scheff in this way requires 
very literal interpretation of his work.2 Those who take the reactionist 
orientation to the study of mental illness do not ordinarily deny the fact 
that persons labeled mentally ill may be suffering from severe disturbances. 
However, they do not interpret these disorders as resulting from intra-
individual pathology (or intrapersonal disorder) as the medical approach 
suggests. 
Individuals associated with the societal reactionist school have referred 
to the problems of the labeled mentally ill in several different ways. For 
example, R. D. Laing (1967) sees them not as psychological problems, but 
instead he characterizes them as disorders in the realm of interexperience, 
or put more simply — what goes on between people. Cooper (1967:29) also 
looks beyond the individual, suggesting that mental disorders are a form of 
disturbed group behavior. Szasz (I960) probably states it most articulately 
when he argues that those labeled mentally ill do not suffer from illness, 
but from "problems of living." Szasz explains that these problems are the 
result of our often radically unharmonious struggle to coexist with our 
fellow man. The actual behaviors that lead to becoming labeled insane are 
interpreted to be reactions to, or even coping devices used to deal with, 
an extremely disordered interpersonal world (e.g. see Goffman, 1961:305-308). 
They are not seen as the irrational expressions of internal disorder. 
It is being suggested here that Gove is inaccurate in his characterization 
of the societal reactionist school. Further, it is being argued that the 
reactionists do recognize the probable existence of severe problems of the 
mentally disordered prior to labeling. However, the societal reactionists 
are quite critical of attempts to explain these problems in medical terms 
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(as intrapersonal disorder). On the other hand, they suggest that the 
problems of the mentally disordered are interpersonal in nature, and 
application of medical techniques as "treatment" can only divert attempts 
at resolution of the "real" problems. 
The Narrow Interpretation of Labeling Processes 
Schur (1971:22) suggests that a frequent error of the critics of the 
societal reactionist school is an overly narrow interpretation of labeling 
processes, "...which considers only direct negative labeling, rather than all 
diverse societal definitions of and responses to the behavior." In this 
context he implies that Gove may be guilty of this error. Gove is vulnerable 
to such criticism because he focuses primarily upon direct, official social 
reaction processes. This may result from the fact that he centers much of 
his criticism on Scheff's work, which does not focus upon the more formal 
aspects of labeling.3 
As I stated above, there are many scholars who adhere to the reactionist 
approach to mental illness, but who accept the idea that the labeled persons 
generally have severe personal problems prior to being labeled. A broader 
interpretation of the reactionist position, drawing from the work of these 
scholars, begins with the idea that most persons considered mentally ill, 
suffer from severe "problems of life" prior to being officially labeled. 
However, these problems are considered in their interpersonal context, and 
not as the intrapersonal disorder called "mental illness." The societal 
reactionists argue that since experience, to a great extent, reflects one's 
social condition (see Laing, 1967:17-45), it follows that disturbing inter-
personal contexts generate highly disturbed states of consciousness. In 
such situations it is likely that the person's symbolic communication and 
behavior will be disordered. This may result from the fact that intensely 
disturbing emotional situations are likely to turn the person inward toward 
contemplation of his problems while reducing his concern for, and sensitivity 
to, other's expectations. Furthermore, it is unlikely that even his closest 
associates will share with him his exact social context, with all its 
complex interrelations. Because of these differences, his associates may 
be unaware of the exact social relationships that are disturbing to him.5 Thus 
they may not see the disturbed person's behavior to be reflective of his 
interpersonal situation. Instead they are more likely to view it as a 
personal disturbance resulting from an internal psychological disorder. 
The crucial juncture at which social reaction has its impact, is at 
the point where the disturbance is interpreted and explained by the actor and 
his audience. The broader reactionist approach attaches much significance 
to the fact that "problems of life" and the disturbing mental states (and 
behaviors) they stimulate, can be interpreted in different ways. As Scheff 
(1966) implies, in most cases such disorders are temporary, that is the 
"problems of life" are resolved or mitigated and the disturbed mental states 
(and behaviors) cease. In these cases the disordered behaviors (residual 
deviance according to Scheff) that did occur, are either ignored or explained 
away as the result of some temporary condition other than mental illness. 
However, there are instances when the person's "problems of life" are not 
resolved, and the disordered experience and behavior continue over an 
extended period of time. Such chronic "problems of life" involve situations 
where a person is embroiled in relationships that are deeply disturbing to 
him, but from which he cannot (or does not wish to) extricate himself. A 
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person who continues in such relationships may even attempt to maintain the 
appearance that they are fully satisfying to him. The maintenance of such an 
illusory definition of situation may be given strong social support by the 
others involved in the relationship. Support may also be provided by social 
ideology that tends to validate the relationship (e.g. the happy family man, 
the contented housewife, the happy worker). Social validation may be so 
intense that the disturbed person himself may not be able to make a direct 
connection between his emotional condition and his disturbing interpersonal 
situation. If his disturbance is severe and he is not aware of its inter-
personal origins, then there may be no other definition of situation available 
(for both him and his associates) that would satisfactorily explain his 
emotional state, except that of mental illness. Once the attribution of the 
mental illness label is made, the interpersonal disturbances (if revealed) 
which the person suffers from, are likely to be viewed as the result, rather 
than the cause, of his mental disorder. Thus, in the end it is the individual, 
rather than his interpersonal situation, that is defined in need of change. 
At the point where the individual's behavior begins to be interpreted as 
a result of mental illness, we can say that the insanity model is applied to 
him. Central to this conception is the idea that the insane person is no 
longer in control of his consciousness. He is considered to be the victim of 
bizarre and distorted ideas, images, and perceptions that burst upon his 
consciouness, preventing him from organizing his behavior in a personally 
acceptable fashion. Finally the model suggests that the problem results from 
intraindividual pathology (whether biological, psychological or symbolic) 
rather than from problems in the person's interpersonal context. The 
insanity model then is a cultural device that makes understandable disordered 
behaviors resulting from nonidentified "problems of life." Furthermore, 
the model offers a rationale for formal social control of the disordered 
behavior. 
The insanity model also provides a context of meaning for the person 
who is undergoing the disorder. If he is in an intensely disturbed emotional 
state, and especially if this condition is prolonged, he is likely to be 
highly confused. The insanity model then, suggests to him symptomatology, 
causation, and a therapeutic course to be run, while relieving him of the 
burdens of his instrumental roles (his normal activities, e.g. job). Through 
this model the person is able to understand his troubled condition, without 
having to attribute the burden of responsibility for it to himself or 
significant others. Instead it is the disease which is at fault. 
Stimulation to apply the insanity model as a mode of interpretation is 
ultimately due to social reaction. It is the multiple levels of this reaction 
that the societal reactionist school should be most interested in. 
Application of the insanity model occurs at three levels. First and 
most obvious is official labeling which involves the intervention of public 
officials (e.g. police, social workers, psychiatrists) who label the person 
as insane, who make the label public knowledge and who subject the labeled 
person to some form of specialized treatment. The possible interpersonal 
and intrapersonal effects of such labeling have been explicated by Scheff 
and many others associated with the societal reactionist school. 
The insanity model may also be applied through a process of informal 
labeling where the person learns that he is insane from the informal 
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communications he receives from others. These communications may go from 
the overt and verbal, to the covert and gestural. The constant negative 
sanctioning that may constitute this form of labeling can be a pervasive 
reminder to the labeled person that he is insane. It is important to point 
out, that most research concerning labeling processes and deviation has 
focused upon direct, public, official labeling. The more subtle, yet 
pervasive informal labeling processes have received less attention from 
researchers, probably because they are much more difficult to measure 
empirically. 
In the case of mental illness, as in the case of other forms of 
deviance, there are situations where individuals take a full deviant role 
without undergoing either formal or informal labeling. In fact Gove (1970: 
876-879} points out that in the case of mental illness, potential labelers 
will often suspend labeling until the person's behavior becomes completely 
disoriented and highly disruptive. A model purporting to deal with the 
origins of mental illness must be able to explain how a person can come to 
think of himself as mentally ill, and even act as a person who is mentally 
ill before being officially or even unofficially labeled by others. 
Deviant acts involve violations of social rules. Social rules are 
often learned early in life and are stored in memory. These rules do not 
exist as isolated elements in memory, but are part of a broader definition 
of situation that includes knowledge of the conditions under which the rules 
are broken, sanctions for breaking the rules and most importantly images 
about the nature of the rule breaker. A person engaging in primary deviant 
acts is likely to know that he is breaking rules, is likely to be aware of 
the possible sanctions if he is caught, and may even carry on an internal 
conversation through which he invokes his own punishment in the form of 
guilt. Finally, he has the potential to apply to himself the relevant social 
stereotype that embodies the imagery defining the nature of the rule breaker 
(this may include identity, motives and even personal style). This means 
that individuals can apply the deviant labels they know, and which they may 
have applied to others, to themselves. I am suggesting that deviant identity 
transformation and even the adoption of a deviant role is possible through a 
third dimension of labeling, self-labeling. Recognizing such a possibility 
is hardly a revolutionary insight, for awareness of this process flows out 
of the symbolic interactionist social psychology on which labeling theory 
is based. This approach recognizes the actor's ability to respond to his own 
gestures, to carry on a socially patterned internal conversation, and finally 
to evaluate himself from the standpoint of the group. Self-labeling involves 
just such processes. 
Let us reconsider the person suffering chronic problems of life, who 
experiences long term emotional disturbances reflecting his disturbing, 
interpersonal, and personal situation. Being a victim of the myth of social 
harmony, he may experience intense unhappiness, diffuse anxiety, and feelings 
of meaninglessness without being able to connect them to the specific context 
that generates them. This person may be doomed to struggle blindly, trying 
to manage his feelings and control consciousness, rather than attempting to 
transform the life situation or interpersonal setting that is at the basis 
of his misery. If he meets futility in this struggle, and if his social 
condition does not change for the better, then self-application of the 
insanity model is likely (if others do not label him first). 
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The insanity model may be applied by official or nonoffici al labelers 
in a direct fashion (this is what Gove is attacking), it may be transmitted by 
peers through covert communications, it may come from the individual himself 
in the process of self-labeling, or more likely it may consist of some 
combination of the three. In any case mental illness starts when the individual 
and his social group begin to interpret his behavior through the insanity 
model. However, this does not mean that there are not problems existent 
prior to the utilization of this mode of interpretation. 
Reactionists are critical of the application of the insanity model 
because they believe that it perpetuates a self-fulfilling prophecy where 
fear of insanity further stimulates its actual occurrence (see Lemert, 1951: 
430). Goffman (1961:132) states in this respect: 
Here I want to stress that perception of losing one's mind is 
based on culturally derived and socially engrained stereotypes 
as to the significance of symptoms such as hearing voices, losing 
temporal and spatial orientation, and sensing that one is being 
followed, and that many of the most spectacular and convincing of 
these symptoms in some instances psychiatri cally signify merely 
a temporary emotional upset in a stressful situation, however 
terrifying to the person at the time. Similarly, the anxiety 
consequent upon this perception of oneself and the strategies 
devised to reduce this anxiety, are not a product of abnormal 
psychology, but would be exhibited by any person socialized into 
our culture who came to conceive of himself as someone losing 
his mind.7 
It is suggested here that once a person begins interpreting events in the 
manner Goffman suggests, a self-perpetuating cycle may occur where the person 
becomes increasingly sensitized to the signs of madness. These signs in turn 
become the validation of the insanity model. 
The events of internal consciousness are generally perceived as insigni-
ficant and are largely ignored by the desensitized normal. However, there are 
times when these events take on additional meaning through such experiences 
as dreams, fantasy, meditative states, and drug experiences. In most instances, 
however, the cultural definition and individual experience of these states is 
not highly threatening, nor anxiety producing (for long periods at least). 
The insanity model serves to sensitize the individual to the events of 
consciousness, while also giving him a context to interpret these events. 
This model suggests that the process of insanity is characterized by losing 
control of one's thought processes such that unwanted imagery and ideas 
explode into direct awareness. The stream of consciousness which once 
constituted reality for the person becomes distorted and profound fear often 
overwhelms the individual. With the intensification of fear the person turns 
inward, anxiously looking for symptoms. As he becomes more sensitized to 
consciousness he becomes aware of internal events he previously ignored. 
Interpreting them as signs of insanity, his worst fears become reality. 
The journey into consciousness stimulated by the insanity model is self-
perpetuating because it sensitizes the person to symptoms that he will probably 
find, that validate the insanity model and which lead to even greater sensitivity 
to symptoms. This journey must, almost by definition, increase social isolation 
because man preoccupied by his internal consciousness is not likely to be 
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terribly sensitive to normative expectations, nor prone to interpersonal 
interaction. Furthermore, attempts to communicate his experience may be 
futile. Remember the mentally ill person is likely to be concerned with his 
inner life. This may be understandable only in terms of the person's unique 
biographical situation and therefore not easily communicable. The suggestion 
is being made here that the application of insanity model intensifies personal 
and interpersonal problems that may have existed prior to its application. 
The broader reactionist orientation discussed above is critical of the 
medically oriented therapeutic approach of those usually responsible for the 
treatment of the mentally disordered in this society. This approach tends 
to validate the insanity model. It often suggests that the behavior of the 
mentally ill is brought about by a disorder internal to the mind. This 
approach invalidates the experience of the victim for it implies that it is 
the meaningless expression of internal disorder, rather than the reaction to 
a highly disturbing interpersonal setting. Medically oriented therapy can 
be damaging because it often validates the worst fears of the person.8 It 
does so, because it suggests to him that his mind has in fact gone out of 
control indicating that he is insane. Also, although it suggests a therapeutic 
course, it almost never pinpoints, and permanently eliminates the supposed 
intraindividual pathogenic agent that causes the disorder. Therefore, 
recurrence of madness is a perpetual possibility, for the person often remains 
vigilant, sensitized to symptoms of disorder. This, in itself, may 
stimulate the onset of madness again. However, the possibilities of recurrence 
are increased even more by the fact that medically oriented treatment tends 
to focus upon the individual and his invisible disease process. Thus, it is 
likely that medical treatment will never lead to the resolution of the inter-
personal problems that may be the source of the person's suffering. The 
medical approach is debilitative because it turns the troubled person inward 
where he meets the unknown and uncontrollable, rather than sensitizing him 
to the interpersonal context in which the problems are embedded. 
Discussed above is a form of labeling much more subtle than that 
suggested by Gove in his critique of the societal reactionist school. The 
labeling process, to be effective, does not have to occur in a conspiratorial 
framework, nor does it need to be direct and public. Labeling does not have to 
appear as an obvious form of victimization where the person is stigmatized 
by overt degradation ceremonials. Labeling can occur in a much subtler way 
where the person, trying to make sense out of his intense problems of life, 
and their concomitant state of consciousness, is directed toward application 
of the insanity model to interpret his behavior. He receives the direction 
from the socialization process through which he learns the conditions 
appropriate to the application of the insanity model to his own behavior and 
the behavior of others. Furthermore, no matter how humane their intentions, 
the therapeutic agencies operating from the medical perspective also perform a 
labeling function. They support and validate the insanity model by suggesting 
that the problem is caused by internal pathology. Finally, all those who pass 
on subtle communications validating the idea that the disordered person is 
sick also are involved in labeling. Some of these communications may be 
extremely subtle and even nonverbal (e.g. all actions which support the 
persons claim to the rights of the rick role). These forms of labeling are 
supported further by the more direct public forms of stigmatization and 
dehumanization of the mentally ill which seem to have made the most impact 
in the popular literature. It must be remembered that these forces are 
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significant, but they are only a part of a much broader process that leads 
to the psychiatric dehumanization of man. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this article has not been to refute Gove. In fact the 
author agrees with Gove's basic point that direct, public forms of labeling 
and stigmatization do not provide a sufficient explanation of mental disorder. 
Also I agree with Gove that it is likely that severe problems are existent 
for the disordered person prior to being labeled.1° However, I disagree with 
the implication made by Gove that the reactionist position contradicts these 
points. Finally, it is suggested that the arguments put forth by Gove are 
not really relevant to the broader conception of the societal reactionist 
school discussed above. However, this does not mean that this broader 
conception of the approach should be accepted as fact. Only future research 
and application will determine the validity and utility of this perspective. 
Footnotes 
*I wish to thank George Ritzer who generously offered substantial criticism 
and advice in the preparation of this paper. 
1. It is interesting to note that Scheff (1966:17) is aware of and even 
cites literature from this tradition. 
2. Scheff (1963) implies that he is aware of the fact that the residual 
deviant may have problems which extend beyond the consequences of direct 
public labeling. For example, he supports his contention that much residual 
deviation is unrecorded by discussing work done by Passamanick. In this 
discussion he indicates that there are unlabeled residual deviants in the 
community who are severely impaired. 
3. It is important to note that Scheff (1966:25-26) seems to be sensitive 
to the limitations of his approach. 
4. It is not being implied here that the person who experiences mental 
illness must have severe problems prior to the onset of madness. It is 
possible that the person may undergo some form of intense temporary disturbance 
which he interprets as symptomatic of madness. This interpretation and the 
fear that it creates may in itself lead the person into insanity. Becker 
(1967:163) suggests that this may have been the case with the many reported 
instances of pot psychosis in the earlier decades of this century. At the time 
the cultural model suggesting that the experiences brought on by pot are 
pleasurable and not dangerous was not disseminated widely. Some people who 
experimented with pot experienced unpleasurable effects and had no other 
way to interpret them except as symptoms of mental disorder. Becker suggests 
that the number of cases of pot psychosis diminished as the new cultural 
stereotype giving definition to the pot experience spread. Becker implies 
a similar situation may exist with LBB cases of drug psychosis indicating that 
mental disorder can be initiated at some times by non-chronic factors. 
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5. Szasz (1970:20) points out that we are often blinded to the personally 
destructive and conflict-laden interpersonal situations, by an ideology that 
leads us to believe that social relations are naturally harmonious. 
6. Paul Roman and Harrison Trice have discussed this process in their paper 
"The Self Reaction: A Neglected Dimension of Labelling Theory" presented 
at the American Sociological Association meetings in 1969. 
7. The underlining is mine, not Goffmans. 
8. The generalization that all psychiatric treatment is debilitative is 
not being suggested. This is obviously not true since several of the 
reactionists (e.g. Laing, Cooper, Esterson, and Szasz) are still practicing 
psychiatrists. However, they reject the idea that mental illness is an 
intraindividual disease. 
9. It is not being asserted here that there are no rehabilitative aspects 
to present therapeutic techniques. However, it is being suggested that as 
a whole, the process may be self-defeating since it reaffirms the person's 
fear that he is mentally ill. Even if he "recovers", the person may always 
be fearful that the symptoms of the disease process may return. This inward 
form of vigilance itself may be able to initiate the return to madness and 
may account for the high levels of recidivism for psychotics. 
10. Although the societal reactionists generally stress interpersonal problems 
as being at the base of emotional and cognitive disorders, they do not 
deny the possibility that organic problems can be the cause of some disorders 
(e.g. obviously they are aware of general paresis). 
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